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Available online 10 June 2014AbstractIslam prohibits risk shifting and encourages risk sharing. Consequently, Muslims have developed over the centuries a highly sophisticated
know-how of risk sharing partnerships which was the envy of the world. When Europe borrowed this know-how from the 10th century onwards,
it entered into the era of “commercial revolution”. 13th century Venice, 19th century Germany and the 20th century United States are the three
western cases presented in this article, which demonstrate the dramatic achievements of risk sharing in the West. Thus, the wisdom of the Islamic
prohibition is confirmed by these Western examples. The paper then examines how Muslims can re-introduce risk sharing techniques into the
modern Islamic finance.
Copyright © 2014, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: Risk sharing; Risk shifting; Islamic finance; Commercial revolution; Gerschenkron hypothesis; Venture capital; Gharar
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Classical sources of Islam prohibit interest transactions but
encourage business partnerships and trade. While interest
transactions shift risks from the capitalist to the entrepreneur,
partnerships lead the two to share them. Thus, it follows that
Islam prefers risk sharing to risk shifting.1
Since it is the risks which generate profits and losses, it
follows that when risks are shared, profits and losses are also
shared. Therefore, risk sharing leads to a share economy, that's
what an Islamic economy is supposed to be all about.
But all of this is theory. What about application? In all
cultures economic theory is translated into application via
institutions. If so, which institutions are we talking about? We* An earlier version of this paper “Origins and Evolution of Risk Sharing in
Islam” was submitted at the Islamic Finance Conference Series-I, convened at
the Istanbul Stock Exchange on March 3rd and 4th, 2014. The author is
grateful to the participants of this conference for their valuable comments.
E-mail address: mcizakca@gmail.com.
1 For substantial evidence on this see; Abbas Mirakhor and et.all, Risk
Sharing in Finance, the Islamic Finance Alternative (Singapore: John Wiley
and Sons, 2012), pp. 52e53.
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Everything boils down to how the capital of the capitalist is
combined with the work and talent of the entrepreneur. In the
conventional system this is done with credit transactions and
the rate of interest. In an Islamic economy it is done by
business partnerships.
Two questions come to mind here:
1) Which partnerships ?
2) Are these partnerships specific to a locality or are they
universal?
In Islamic economic history, the most important partner-
ships observed were the mudaraba and its derivatives.
Mudaraba was born in the Middle East and then spread to the
whole of the Islamic world from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
With the crusaders, it even spread to Europe. During the
late 12th century Eleanor of Aquitane, the Queen of France,
brought the Islamic law of Partnerships, as well as the
Admiralty Law, from Jerusalem to France. In France, at the
Island of Oleron, these laws were then incorporated into theting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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During this incorporation, Islamic mudaraba was called
commenda by the Europeans.
Borrowing the Islamic risk sharing partnerships appears to
have had a huge impact on European economic, financial and
even political history. To start with, soon after the incorpora-
tion, Europe entered into a period of massive increase in
commerce, known as the “commercial revolution”. Put
differently, it was the risk sharing mudaraba/commenda con-
tract which financed this massive increase of trade both within
Europe and across the Mediterranean.
Two Italian city-states Genoa and Venice specialized in
trade between Europe and the Islamic world. Acemoglu and
Robinson have demonstrated definitively that Venice became a
super power of the period thanks to its new merchant class
using the mudaraba/commenda. But when the old elite began
to fear the rising new merchant class and decided to prohibit
mudaraba/commenda, during the late 13th century, this was
the beginning of decline for Venice.3 Indeed, for as long as the
young men of Venice could freely practice the mudaraba/
commenda in foreign trade, Venice prospered and became
powerful. But when this risk sharing contract was banned and
the rising new mercantile class was ousted from the decision
making process, the city began to decline.
To this 13th century Venetian example we can also add the
late 19th century example from Germany. Recently, the well-
known Gerschenkron hypothesis stating that the “peculiar
character of Germany's financial institutions played a critical
role in industrialization and in overtaking of England” has
been confirmed.4 The “peculiar character” refers to the fact
that stock markets in Germany replaced loan markets as the
major source of capital.5 In the terminology of this paper, this
means that risk sharing had replaced risk shifting as the most
important method of finance in Germany and, according to
Gerschenkron as confirmed by Lehmann, this replacement
played a critical role in the industrialization of Germany and
its success in overtaking England, where loan markets
continued to predominate.
These two European cases, one from the 13th and the other
from the late 19th centuries, demonstrate without any doubt
whatsoever the power of risk-sharing finance. In what follows,
I will refer to a third case as well, the American venture capital
of the late 20th century, which will also confirm the basic2 Daniel Panzac, “Le Contrat d’Affrement maritime en Mediterranee “,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 45, No. 3, pp.
351e8; Alison Weir, Eleanor of Aquitane, p.1, 318; Hassan S. Khalilieh,
Admiralty and Maritime Laws in the Mediterranean, (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
2006).
3 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail, (New York:
Crown Business, 2012), pp. 152e156.
4 Sibylle H. Lehmann, “Taking Firms to the Stock Market: IPOs and the
Importance of Large Banks in Imperial Germany, 1896-1913”, Economic
History Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2014, 92e122.
5 Sibylle H. Lehmann, “Taking Firms to the Stock Market: IPOs and the
Importance of Large Banks in Imperial Germany, 1896e1913”, Economic
History Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2014, p. 93.argument here. But before doing so, we need to go back to the
Islamic world and study risk sharing in Islam further.
1. Resilience of Islamic partnerships
Another remarkable feature of the classical Islamic part-
nerships is their resilience. A thousand years after their birth,
they can be observed in Ottoman finances without any change
in their structure.6
There is one financial instrument, however, which can be
considered as typical Ottoman. These were the Cash Waqfs.
Cash waqfs were charitable foundations established with
cash.7 In brief, their modus operandi was as follows:
A wealthy person donated a certain amount of cash for a
charitable purpose. The money was invested and the revenue it
generated was spent for the charitable purpose of the donation.
When Imam Zufar was asked during the 8th century how a
cash waqf should function, he said, the cash capital should be
invested with mudaraba.
But when Ottoman cash waqfs were studied, it became
clear that they did not apply mudaraba. Had they done so, they
would have become risk sharing instruments. Instead, they
applied istiglal, a basically risk shifting instrument.
We wonder at this point why the Ottoman cash waqfs failed
to apply Imam Zufar's ruling and in the process became risk
shifting institutions. The most plausible explanation is the
profit limits imposed by the Ottoman state. As it is well
known, mudaraba is a risky instrument and it may end up with
losses. Such losses can be tolerated only if there is no upper
limit imposed on profits so as to compensate the losses with
the high profits generated. But maximum profit limits in the
range of 5e20 percent was the rule in the Ottoman economy.
With such profit controls waqf trustees refused to apply the
risky mudaraba and preferred istiglal. Thus, profit limits
imposed by the state killed any potential for risk sharing by
cash waqfs. So, the relevance of all this for us today is that risk
sharing and profit limits imposed by an authority are simply
incompatible.
All of this pertains to private finance. What about state
finance? Indeed, all governments need to borrow money from
the public. But how does an Islamic government do this?
Obviously it cannot borrow with interest.
The earliest solution found was tax-farming. The origins of
tax-farming can be traced back to the early centuries of Islam.
The Ottoman version of this system was called iltizam. In
iltizam taxes were collected by the private enterprise and en-
trepreneurs were delegated the right to collect taxes. So, can
we consider this arrangement as risk sharing? Not really, the
state was shifting all the risks upon the agent or the entre-
preneur. Indeed, the entrepreneur not only paid a fixed amount6 Murat Çizakça, Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1996).
7 Murat Çizakça, A History of Philanthropic Foundations: Islamic World
from the Seventh Century to the Present (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press,
2000). Also available at www.muratcizakca.com and www.academia.edu.
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would be allowed to collect taxes for a certain period.
Moreover, with so much uncertainty and risk shifting, ilti-
zam also contained elements of gharar.8 The consequence of
all this risk shifting and gharar was that the state was not
earning much. This became obvious in 1683, when Ottoman
armies were defeated at the gates of Vienna and the state
budget began to exhibit substantial deficits.
In 1695 a new system, the malikane, had to be introduced.
Now the tenure of the entrepreneur increased to his life-time.
In return for this increased reliability of the tenure, the en-
trepreneurs began to compete in the auctions yielding much
higher revenues to the state.
Malikane can be considered as a system of risk sharing.
The entrepreneur took a great risk and made a very large
lump-sum payment up front. Now the risks were shared fairly:
If the entrepreneur lived a long life, he would make substantial
profits, and the state would lose. If he lived a short life, the
state could take back the tax-farm at his death and re-sell it
again at a new auction making substantial profits. With such
risk sharing, the gharar was eliminated as well.
As a result of all this, the Ottoman state was able to in-
crease its revenues by 1400%.9 This is a dramatic confirmation
of the relative efficiency of risk sharing vis a vis risk shifting
in Islamic state finance.
But even such financial successes could not protect the
Ottoman state from the aggression of Imperial Russia, which
was enjoying a population explosion and had doubled its
population during the 18th century. Ottoman armies suffered a
disastrous defeat in 1774 and a huge war indemnity had to be
paid. A new system that would be able to collect this amount,
rapidly and legally was needed.
The solution found was the esham.10 In this system, the
state set aside an asset, which yielded a regular annual reve-
nue. It then allocated a certain fraction of this revenue for
esham. This revenue fraction was then securitized into equal
shares and offered for sale to the public. Each share authorized
its purchaser, the investor, to receive his share of the allocated
annual revenue pro rata. This was a fixed amount. The investor
received his annuity for as long as he lived. Each share was
sold at a certain multiple of the annuity it was to yield to the
investor. Usually, the price of a share was determined as 5 to
12 times the annuity it yielded. Once bought, each sehm was
negotiable and could be sold in secondary markets.
Two questions would be relevant here.
1) Was esham usurious?
2) Was it an instrument of risk sharing?8 Gharar is a level of unshared uncertainty that Islamic law prohibits. What
makes gharar illegal is not only the level of uncertainty but also the fact that
risk is not shared among the contracting parties.
9 Mehmet Genç, “Osmanlı Maliyesinde malikane Sistemi”, in Osman Okyar
(ed.), Tu¨rkiye _Iktisat Tarihi Semineri (Ankara: Hacettepe U¨niversitesi
Yayınları, 1975), s. 249.
10 Çizakça, M. (2013). Proposal for innovation in the capital markets. Global
Islamic Finance Report, 91e93.The answer to the first question is negative: It was not
usurious. What makes esham non-usurious, riba free, was the
fact that first, redemption was at the discretion of the state. Put
differently, the borrower, i.e., the state, paid back the principal
at its convenience. There was no pre-fixed and obligatory date
of redemption. Second, there was uncertainty and risk sharing.
This was a result of the uncertainty of the life-span of the
investor, as well as, the fluctuating economic conjuncture. As
was the case with malikane, in esham also, if the investor
enjoyed longevity, the state would lose, and if he lived a short
life it would gain. So, the risk with regard to the life-span was
shared.
Profit/loss sharing reflecting the economic conjuncture also
occurred when the investor sold his share in secondary mar-
kets at current prices. In short, esham system involved risk
sharing as well as profit and loss sharing.
Finally, we may ask, was esham successful in meeting the
financial needs of the Ottoman state? The new system suc-
ceeded in raising one-third of the war indemnity within less
than a year. Within ten years of its establishment, in 1785,
Esham generated 11,500,000 grus‚ revenue, which was more
than half of the entire revenue of the state. It has been
calculated that what the previous malikane system was able to
generate in 90 years, Esham succeeded to generate in only 10
years.11 On the down side, total annuity payments reached
10% of the total expenditure of the state.
Basically a risk-sharing system, Esham came to dominate
the Ottoman public finance for the next century or so and
played a decisive role in the survival of the Ottoman state until
the 20th century.
2. Twentieth century developments and the present
The most important development of the 20th century in
Islamic finance was the establishment of the first Islamic bank
in Mit Ghamr in Egypt by Dr. Ahmed el-Naggar. El-Naggar’s
bank was based on a two layer multiple mudaraba. In other
words, both the liability and the asset sides were designed as
multiple mudarabas.
Consequently, It was a truly risk sharing system. But it did
not last and all the other Islamic banks established later on
applied murabaha rather than mudaraba in their asset sides.
Thus they abandoned risk sharing and focused on trade
financing based on the murabaha mark-up.
3. What needs to be done?
Replacement of mudaraba by murabaha has caused great
disappointment with the Islamic banks. This is because,
murabaha is a simple mark-up and is not based upon risk
sharing.
So, how can the Islamic banks be encouraged to focus on
mudaraba financing, which was the original design of Dr.
Ahmed el-Naggar? Very briefly, the following observations11 Mehmet Genç, “Esham”, _Islam Ansiklopedisi (Diyanet), c. 11, s. 378.
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taught us that it is unrealistic to expect Islamic Banks to be
involved in risk sharing with their depositors, who demand
fixed returns.
Private sector risk sharing needs to be undertaken by non-
bank financial institutions. Western experience since the Sec-
ond World War indicates to venture capital as the most
pertinent non-bank financial institution. It has been shown that
venture capital is in perfect harmony with the teachings of the
classical sources of Islam. Indeed, this American institution,
the financier of such companies as Apple, Fed Ex, Amazon
etc., has a structure that is remarkably similar to the classical
Islamic multiple mudaraba.12
If a western institution is highly successful and it is also
practically identical to a classical Islamic institution, then it is
obvious that Muslims should do their utmost to re-introduce
it.13
4. Introducing venture capital (VC)
The following simple principles must be remembered while
establishing a venture capital sector.
1) The heart of VC is the venture capital company. So, the
state must make the establishment of these companies as
easy as possible. Insisting on a high threshold minimum
paid-in capital would be wrong. This was the mistake that
the Turkish Capital Market Board did during the 1990s. A
venture capital firm should not be confused with banks.
Such a firm does not collect deposits, therefore, it does not
create risks for the public. If it becomes bankrupt, it would
only hurt its own shareholders. So, no paid-in capital
requirement should be imposed at all.
2) Venture Capital is a private sector activity. Some state
support might be needed initially, but this must be strictly
for the short term and of secondary importance.
3) Initial state support should be in the form of fund
matching. This means, the government can declare that if a
venture capital company has decided to finance an entre-
preneur, the state shall also buy the shares of that entre-
preneur at a maximum rate of 49%, so that the VC
company would have the final say in the management.
4) Tax breaks can also be important. Capital Gains Tax
should be zero percent. Inheritances if invested in equities
can also be taxed at zero percent.
5) Pension funds can be a very important source for venture
capital companies. If these funds are given the permission12 Murat Çizakça, Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships (Leiden:
Brill, 1996), chs. 2 and 6.For a more detailed and upto date treatment of the
topic see; Murat Çizakça, Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution
and the Future (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), ch. 15.
13 For a detailed treatment of this topic, the reader is recommended to look at,
Murat Cizakca, Islamic Capitalism and Finance, ch. 15; id. “Introducing
Venture Capital to Islamic Countries”, www.muratcizakca.com or Murat
Çizakça ve Tansu Çiller, Tu¨rk Finans Kesiminde Sorunlar ve Reform €Onerileri
(_Istanbul: Istanbul Sanayi Odası, 1989).to invest even a small percentage of their funds in VC, that
would be a great support. In the US the 1974 ERISA Act
did just that with a huge impact.
On the Asset Side, the main principle to be remembered is
this: the ultimate goal of the venture capitalist is to sell the
shares of the entrepreneurial firm he has financed, preferably
with great profits. For this;
6) A well-functioning “over the counter market” needs to be
established.
7) Professors and their research students are the ideal po-
tential entrepreneurs. Venture capital-university linkages
are very important. Universities must give professors and
their students the freedom to establish their own com-
panies. Only then can the venture capital companies
become actively engaged with universities.
8) If research is financed with government money, patents
obtained should not be in the name of the state but in the
name of the research team. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
did precisely this in the US, with very impressive results.
This is essential to make the most out of the university
techno-parks.
9) Since VC is simply impossible without entrepreneurs and
the domestic pool of entrepreneurs may be insufficient,
immigration rules can be relaxed for skilled foreign
entrepreneurs.5. Conclusion
By prohibiting the rate of interest, Islam has condemned
risk shifting and made risk sharing the definitive mode of
finance for Muslims. The economic rationale and wisdom of
this prohibition has been demonstrated by three cases from the
West, the 13th century Venice, the late 19th century Germany
and the 20th century United States.
Muslims possess the know-how to establish and conduct
risk sharing financial institutions. This Islamic know-how was
so rich that the 13th century European commercial revolution
was made possible only by borrowing and incorporating it into
the Lex Mercatoria. The crucial question is therefore, whether
Muslims of the 21st century will be able to draw upon their
rich heritage and re-orient themselves from risk shifting to risk
sharing.
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